Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON -- Ten years after the successful liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces, the key Marine Corps players met at the base theatre here to relive the events for a professional military education session.

The top brass from U.S. Central Command, 1st Force Service Support Group, 1st Marine Division and others relayed successes and concerns for Camp Pendleton officers and staff noncommissioned officers.

"Ten years ago, the country was euphoric," said retired LtGen. B. E. Trainor, moderator for the event.  "There were yellow ribbons everywhere."

The Marine Corps victory was so quick and decisive that it upset the timetable of the war for the other services.  The overall campaign strategy did not take into account this rapid action.  The Marines liberated Kuwait more swiftly than planned that the best Iraqi forces turned and escaped said General Trainor.

"You guys in the front row are guilty and are called upon today to answer for your sins," quipped General Trainor as he addressed the panel of Marine generals sitting in the front row.

However, prior to the quick Marine Corps victory in Kuwait, there were various obstacles behind the scenes that had to be overcome.

One key issue was comprising a single Marine Corps fighting machine from various units all over the country.

"There were compositing issues," said retired LtGen. J. A. Brabham, commanding general of 1st FSSG during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.  "You can't fight as you came.  Once in country commands go away, staffs go away.  You have to break apart the unit and put it back together."

This became a concern because Marines have unit pride, General Brabham explained.  There was doctrine available on how to composite units, but it had never been put to the test prior to Desert Storm.  One solution to this problem was the creation of Task Forces.  There were several Task Forces stood up during the war that comprised units from different commands and different locations.  This allowed the Marines to maintain their unit integrity while working with other units to achieve a common goal.

Another issue was the role of supporting establishments in theatre and back home. 

"A lesson learned was that supporting establishments are not a secondary concern, they should be a vital role," said retired MajGen. J. M. Myatt, former commanding general of 1st Marine Division.
"The priority was placed on warriors," said General Brabham.  "But who was going to take care of them?"

There were four to five C-141 aircraft departing every day filled with Marines from a single military occupational speciality.  It was determined after Marines were in country with little to no infrastructure, that Marines should deployed as balanced functional capability modules.  Instead of sending a batch of engineers, they started sending engineers, clerks, messmen, etc.

Once the support was in country, a confidence in the supply system was not.
"The supply system is not credible with Marines," said General Brabham.  "Marines don't trust supply so they hoard supplies."

According to General Brabham, this feeling is as true today as it was ten years ago.
While the Maritime Prepositioning Forces proved to be an invaluable asset during the war, the Marines were unprepared for the amount of time it would take to locate and distribute the supplies.

Because the MPF uses a different warehousing system, supply Marines could not locate supplies in a timely manner. 

"(MPF had everything we needed) but we couldn't get at the supplies to use them," said General Brabham.  "It took 10 days to take everything out and re-warehouse it."

Because of this lack of confidence in the supply system, Division Marines removed components from the gear they left behind so they would have what they needed for replacements in country.  This caused most of Division assets to be unusable had the need arisen to deploy even more units from Camp Pendleton.

Marines also weren't prepared for services like mail, exchange, grave registration or the handling of enemy prisoners of war. General Brabham added that his postal Marines were aided by doctors and nurses from the hospital staff.

"I had 18 postal Marines who handled 130 tons of mail a day," said General Brabham. 
Initial estimates had expected 10,000 casualties after the ground war started.  The FSSG only had 4,000 body bags.  Fortunately, grave registration did not become an issue, but it is a reality.

"Expectations versus reality was a big concern," said General Brabham.  "We can do a lot in garrison that we can't do in a tactical environment.   At exercises, everything works which gives us false expectations.  We need to bring reality along."

Preparing Marines for deployment is an on-going process, but preparing family members for deployment should also be paramount.

Because of the large scope of involvement, there were Marines deploying who normally did not deploy.  This put an undue burden on some family members.

"Our preparedness to deploy was not there.  We had many Marines who were not used to deploying who had dependents that didn't have ID cards or driver's licenses," said General Myatt.

Some advice that General Myatt shared was to give latitude to your Marines to express ideas.  He cautioned the audience to let Marines innovate and they will come up with solutions to help solve your problems.

When asked to sum up what was the biggest lesson learned, General Myatt said "Don't try to do everyone else's job.  Trust your SNCOs and NCOs and trust each other."